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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
ROBERT P. MORRIS, and GUMP & 
AYERS REAL ESTATE, INC., 
vs. 
Plaintiffs and 
Respondents, 
JOHN PRICE ASSOCIATES, INC., 
Defendant and Appellant. 
BRIEF OF APPELLA&T 
NATURE OF THE CASE 
Case No. 15660 
This is a breach of contract action for recovery of a 
real estate commission arising out of the leasing of an office 
building by Defendant to IBM Corporation. 
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT 
This case was tried to a jury on December 12 and 13, 1977. 
The jury returned a verdict in favor of Plaintiffs. The issue 
of damages was not submitted to the jury, it being merely a 
matter of arithmetic computation for the court to perform. 
The court entered judgment on the verdict on December 20, 
1977. Thereafter, post tr1al motions for Judgment NOV or 
New Trial were filed and argued. Those motions were denied. 
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RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Defendant seeks a reversal of the Judgment entered below. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Plaintiff Robert P. Morris is a real estate saleman who 
was employed by Plaintiff Gump and Ayers Real Estate, Inc. 
from late 1974 through August of 1975. (R. pp. 196, 224). 
Gump and Ayers Real Estate, Inc. is a real estate broker. 
(R. p. 223). 
Defendant is engaged in the business of contracting and 
developing, and during 1975, also engaged in leasing certain 
properties owned by affiliate companies or by its president, 
John Price. (R. pp. 267, 268). 
This action arises out of an alleged letter agreement 
dated January 29, 1975. (R. pp. 4, 203). Due to its 
brevity, the letter (Ex. P.-1) is set forth below in its 
entirety: 
January 29, 1975 
Mr. Rob Morris 
Gump & Ayers 
240 East 2100 South 
Salt Lake City, Utah 
Dear Rob: 
Re: Meredian Park Office Building 
This letter is to assure you that we will cover you on 
a 6% commission if a successful lease is negotiated 
-2-
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with IBM on the second building of Meredian Park Office 
Building. 
GLM:ef 
Regards, 
JOHN PRICE ASSOCIATES, INC. 
/s/ 
G. L. Machan 
Vice President, 
Real Estate 
The Meredian Park office complex referred to in the 
letter was originally owned by a limited partnership known 
as Meredian Park Associates (R. p. 268). It was sold to a 
third party in the fall of 1976. (Id.). Prior to the sale, 
in July of 1976, a three year lease was signed between IBM 
Corporation and Meredian Park Associates. (R. p. 231; Ex. 
P-4). It is undisputed that all negotiations concerning 
this lease were performed by Defendant; Plaintiffs were not 
involved. ( R. pp. 211, 24 7, 310, 312). The actual negotia-
tions took 8 months and were tedious and complex. (R. pp. 
247, 275). 
The factual background adduced in this case indicates 
that Mr. Morris had been attempting to lease office space in 
Salt Lake City to IBM Corporation for several years, but to 
no avail. (R. pp. 197,198). As a result of such attempts, 
Mr. Morris became acquainted with several employees of IBM, 
two of ~hom were in the real estate department. (R. pp. 
196, 197). 
-3-
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In the fall of 1974, Mr. Morris became aware that the 
second building of the Meredian Park office complex was or 
would be available for lease (R. p. 200). Thereafter, and 
prior to the alleged commission letter being procured, 
Mr. Morris claims that he showed the building to Mr. Vern 
Swenson, then head of IBM's real estate department for the 
western u.s. (R. p. 215). However, Mr. Swenson does not 
recall being shown the premises at all by Mr. Morris (R. p. 
324). 
In any event, on or about January 29, 1975, Mr. Morris 
telephoned John Price, Defendant's president, concerning 
the property. (R. p. 201). The evidence concerning the 
substance of that conversation is conflicting, but Mr. 
Morris claims he told Mr. Price of his contacts with IBM and 
that IBM was interested in leasing the second building of 
Meredian Park. (R. p. 201, 202). Mr. Morris also claims 
that Mr. Price directed him to stop by Defendant's offices 
and pick up a commission letter and a set of plans from Mr. 
Machan, Defendant's vice president. (Id.) Mr. Price denies 
authorizing the letter, claims it was procured by misrepresen-
tation, and generally disagrees with the way things happened. 
(R. PP· 269-272). Nevertheless, Mr. Morris stopped by the 
offices of Defendant on or about January 29, 1975, and 
obtained the alleged commission Letter and a set of ?lans to 
-4-
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the building. (R. p. 203). He also obtained a cover letter 
for the plans, which he signed. ( R. p. 204; Ex. P-2). The 
cover letter was written on Defendant's stationery. (Ex. 
P-2). Defendant did not authorize Mr. Morris to write the 
letter on its stationery and Mr. Morris does not claim he 
was so authorized. (R. pp. 242, 246). 
Mr. Morris testified that on or about January 29, 
1975, he delivered to Mr. Vern Swenson of IBM in Los Angeles 
the cover letter and a set of plans to the second building 
of the Meredian Park office complex. ( R • p • 2 0 5 ) • Mo r r i s 
stated that he discussed the project over lunch with Mr. 
Swenson on that day. (R. p. 206). ,Morris further testified 
that he met with Mr. Swenson three to five weeks later in 
Salt Lake City and discussed the project briefly. ( Id.) 
~r. Morris recalled no further contact with Mr. Swenson or 
anyone from the real estate department of IBM. (R. p. 207). 
He did, however, state that he remained in contact with Mr. 
Chuck Woodward, local IBM typewriter salesman, through the 
fall of 1975 respecting the Meredian Park project. (Id.) 
Mr. Morris admitted that he was not involved in the 
negotiation of the lease with IBM; that he did not know the 
terms of the lease, and; that he had no business contact 
whatsoever with Mr. Ray Zimmerman, the authorized IBM 
employee wno commenced and ult1mately consummated tne lease 
-5-
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negotiations with Defendant. (R. pp. 211, 310, 311). 
The evidence in the record is uncontroverted that 
Mr. Ray Zimmerman was the only employee of IBM who was 
authorized to negotiate a lease for space in the Salt Lake 
City area during the time period in question. (R. pp. 305-
309, 329-330, 346-347). The only contact between Morris and 
Mr. Zimmerman was a brief conversation consisting entirely of 
"pleasantries.• (R. p. 310). Mr. Zimmerman does recall 
seeing one letter from Morris to Vern Swenson in the IBM 
files which was footnoted by Mr. John Lind, another IBM 
employee. (R. pp. 312, 349). There was no testimony, how-
ever, from Mr. Zimmerman or any other person as to when he 
first saw that letter, whether or not he took any action as 
a result of seeing the letter or whether he had even read 
it. There is no testimony in the record from Mr. Zimmerman 
or anyone else as to whether he even saw a set of plans on 
the project priot to the time when he began negot1ations 
with Defendant in late 1975. 
Mr. Vern Swenson of IBM recalled that he had lunch 
with Mr. Morris in late January of 1975 in Los Angeles. (R. 
PP· 321, 322). He did not recall whether the Meridian Park 
office building was discussed or whether Morris left a 
letter and plans with him. (Id.) However, he d1d state 
that other projects were discussed at tnat ti~e. tR. p. 
325). He recalls seeing ~orris sometime later 1n Salt ~ake 
-6-
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City, but does not recall discussing Meredian Park. ( Id.) 
Mr. Swenson was not involved in the lease negotiations 
between defendant and IBM. (R. p. 332). Further, he 
testified that local people, such as Mr. Chuck Woodward had 
no authority to act on behalf of IBM with respect to the 
acquisition of leased space or other real estate activities. 
(R. p. 329). 
During the period of January 1975 through September of 
1975 Mr. John Lind of IBM was the IBM employee charged with 
the cond~ct of its real estate operations in Utah. (R. pp. 
346, 355). He testified unequivocally that during said 
period of time ~ ~ at IBM had any authority to negotiate 
for additional leased space 1n Salt Lake City, and furthermore, 
no decision had been made by IBM as to whether it even 
needed any additional space. (R. pp. 356, 358, 323, 306). 
At no time did Mr. Lind have any contact with Mr. Morris 
relative to the Meredian Park office complex. (R. p. 359). 
There was no contact whatsoever between Plaintiffs and 
Defendant between January 29, 1975, and March 12, 1976--after 
the basic deal had been negotiated with IBM. Morris was 
unaware of any specific requirements IBM may have had 
and he did not know of any specif1cs relative to the project 
such as: actual available square footage, rent charge, 
ava1:able ~er~, "flt-up" prov1s1ons, parKlng or ownership 
-7-
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of the property. (R. pp. 211, 212, 278-280). Moreover, he 
never made any attempt whatsoever to acqua1nt himself with 
these factors. (R. pp. 278-280). Morris had no contact 
whatsoever with any of the lease negotiations and he had no 
idea whether they were progressing along or whether they had 
even begun. (R. pp. 211, 212). Morris made no effort to 
follow-up on his initial contacts with Mr. Swenson or with 
any of the other IBM real estate personnel. (R. p. 295). 
Morris made no formal introduction of the two authorized 
principals involved and he had no knowledge of the lease 
terms to which each could agree. (R. pp. 278-280, 247). 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
PLAINTIFFS DID NOT ADDUCE ANY EVIDENCE 
WHATSOEVER TO PROVE THAT THEY WERE THE 
"PROCURING CAUSE" OF THE LEASE WITH IBM. 
Under Utah law, which follows the general rule regarding 
brokerage agreements, in order for a broker to recover a 
commission his efforts must have been the procuring cause 
which resulted in the closing of the transaction upon which 
his claim is predicated. In this case, it is essential for 
Plaintiffs to prove that they were the procuring cause ot 
the lease with IBM since such performance is the only consld-
eration to support the contract they seek to enforce. 
In Brooks v. George Q. Cannon Assn., 178 Pac. 539 
-8-
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(Utah, 1919), the court considered a case very similar to the 
one at bar. Plaintiff Brooks had entered into an agreement 
with defendant to obtain a loan for defendant. Concurrently, 
one of defendant's directors was also seeking lenders to make 
the same loan to defendant. The evidence showed that prior to 
any loan being obtained by defendant, plaintiff and one LaBlonde 
had written to the Travelers Insurance Co. regarding a loan 
to defendant and had received a favorable reply to their 
letter. There was no significant follow-up to this letter, but 
later a loan was negotiated directly between defendant and 
Travelers. Plaintiff then claimed a commission on the loan. 
The case was tried to a jury and a judgment rendered for 
plaintiff. The Supreme Court reversed, finding no evidence to 
prove that plaintiff was the procuring cause of the loan. Of 
principal importance to the court's decision were facts to the 
effect that: (1) months had gone by between plaintiff's 
contact with Travelers and the date of closing; (2) the persons 
contacted by plaintiff at Travelers were not authorized to make 
the loan, and; (3) plaintiff had no part in negotiating the loan 
nor in supplying the necessary data and information whereby it 
was finally consummated. 178 Pac. at 591. In its ruling, 
the court stated the law as follows: 
It 1s elementary in this class of cases that in 
order for a croker to recover comm1ss1ons his 
efforts must nave oeen tne procuring cause wh1ch 
resulted in the closing of the transaction upon 
-9-
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which his claim is predicated. The rule is 
variously stated in the decisions of the courts 
and by the textwriters, but all are agreed that 
the efforts of the broker, in order to entitle 
him to a commission, must have been the effi-
cient procuring or producing cause of the trans-
action relied upon by him. Id. 
May other courts have reached the same conclusion as 
the Utah court using similar rationale. In Hampton Park Corp. 
v. T. D. Burgess Co., Inc., 270 Md. 269, 311 A.2d 35 (1973), 
the Maryland Supreme Court reversed a trial court ruling in 
favor of plaintiff and held, inter alia, that for a broker to 
earn his commission "the negotiations conducted by the broker 
must have progressed to a point where success seems imminent 
and, it is not sufficient that the broker merely planted 
the seed from which the harvest was reaped." 311 A.2d at 423. 
A key factor in the ruling of the Maryland court in this 
case was that much of plaintiff's effort was directed toward 
employees of the eventual purchaser who had not been authorized 
to conduct the actual negotiations. Id. To the same effect 
see Walker v. David Davies, Inc., 34 Ohio App.2d 139, 296 
N.E.2d 691, 693 (1973), where the appeals court overruled 
a jury verdict in favor of plaintiff on the grounds that 
plaintiffs' efforts were not the procuring cause of the sale 
because they were directed primarily toward a person who had 
no direct dealings in the final negotiation of tne sale. 
Another case in point in Link v. PatricK, 367 P.2d ~s; 
(Alaska, 1961), wherein the Alaska Supreme Court reversed a 
-10-
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lower court judgment for plaintiff-broker because plaintiff 
had failed to meet his burden of proving that he was the 
procuring cause of the sale. The court there noted that, at 
best, plaintiff had presented evidence from which it could 
be "inferred" that plaintiff could have been the procuring 
cause--such inference the court concluded did not meet the 
burden of proof. Id. at 158. 
The Utah court is in full agreement with the evidentiary 
position of the Link case, supra. In Sumsion v. Streator-Smith, 
Inc., 103 Utah 44, 132 P.2d 680 (1943), Justice Wolfe, in this 
oft-cited case, held that: 
While deductions may be based on probabilities, 
the evidence must do more than merely raise a 
conjecture or show a probability. Where there are 
probabilities the other way equally or more potent 
the deductions are mere guesses and the jury 
should not be permitted to speculate .•. The 
evidence must, however, do more than merely raise 
a conjecture or show a probability as to the cause 
of the injury, and no recovery can be had if the 
evidence leaves to conjecture which of two probable 
causes resulted in the injury, where defendant was 
liable for only one of them. 132 P.2d at 683. 
See also, Olsen v. Warwood, 255 P.2d 725 (Utah, 1953); Bolt v. 
Davis, 70 N.M. 449, 374 P.2d 648 (1962). 
From the foregoing case law, in order for Plaintiffs to 
sustain their burden on the issue of procuring cause they must 
show that: 
(l) T~ey not only planted the seed which d1rectly 
~roduced tne narvest, out that they were 
involved in the transaction to a ?Oint where 
success seemed imm1nent; 
-11-
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{ 2) 
{3) 
{4) 
Their dealings were with persons authorized 
to consummate the transaction; 
The time lapse between their efforts and 
the closing was not unreasonably attenuated, 
and; 
The transaction in fact resulted from their 
efforts--not jus~that it might have. 
When the above criteria are applied to the facts of 
the instant case, Plaintiffs fail on each and every point. 
At best it might be said that Plaintiffs could possibly 
have planted a seed--their involvement ended there. At the 
time of their dealings with IBM success was at least a year 
away and IBM was neither interested in leasing nor authorized 
to do so. Plaintiffs had no business dealings whatsoever with 
any persons at IBM who were authorized to negotiate the lease. 
The time lapse between Plaintiffs' efforts and the closing was 
18 months, during which time Mr. Morris' only contact was with 
Mr. Woodward, the local typewriter man. During this extended 
period Morris did nothing whatever to follow-up. Finally the 
evidence shows that the procuring cause of the lease could have 
been a number of different things. It could have been a result 
of a mailing by Defendant. {R. p. 273). It could have 
been a result of the independent efforts of Mr. Zimmerman. (R. 
p. 308). It could have been as a result of a later contact by 
Defendant. {R. p. 274). The evidence is equally suscepdble 
to inferences supporting any of the foregoing "procur1ng 
-12-
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causes," any of which after the 18-month lapse is more probable 
than the one the Plaintiffs claim. In addition, by delivering 
the plans with a cover letter on Defendant's stationery, Mr. 
Morris attempted to convey the impression that he was an 
employee of Defendant, thereby voluntarily removing himself 
from any further contact or involvement. 
In the final analysis the fact remains that Plaintiffs 
produced no affirmative evidence to prove that they were the 
procuring cause of the lease with IBM. A contrary finding is 
simply unsupported by any substantial, credible and legally 
sufficient evidence. 
POINT II 
INSTRUCTION NO. 11 GIVEN BY THE COURT IMPROP-
ERLY STATES THE LAW OF "PROCURING CAUSE" AND 
IS CLEARLY PREJUDICIAL TO DEFENDANT. 
Instruction No. 11 given by the court in this case reads 
as follows: 
To recover, plaintiffs must show by a pre-
ponderance that they were the procuring cause of 
the lease between IBM and defendant. To be the 
procuring cause of the lease, plaintiffs must have 
set a chain of events in motion that finally 
resulted in the lease. If the events caused by 
the plaintiffs' acts came to nothing, and the 
lease was entered because of completely new and 
independent causes, then plaintiffs cannot recover. 
However, this does not mean that plaintiffs must 
have participated at every step of negotiations or 
even in most of them. Nor does it mean that 
plaintiffs were not the procuring cause if others 
would have set the same chain of events 1n motion 
had elaintlffs not dcne so. (Empnasis added.) 
-13-
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This instruction conveys the clear impression that to 
be the procuring cause in this transaction all Plaintiffs had 
to do was start the ball rolling--no matter if someone else had 
to push it to its destination. This is not what procuring 
cause means. 
In Reed v. Taylor, 322 P.2d 147 (Wyo., 1958), the 
Wyoming court had occasion to interpret and analyze the 
definition of procuring cause as set forth in the Utah case 
of Brooks v. George Q. Cannon Assn., supra, and others. 
The Wyoming court held that where more than one party is 
seeking to procure a sale or lease for a seller (as is the 
case here) the sale must arise from the foundation laid by 
the broker in order to entitle him to a commission. The 
court there stated that: 
The mere introduction of a prospect to an owner 
or even the broker's participation is unsuccess-
ful negotiations between the parties does not 
earn the broker a commission . In such 
a case the introduction of a prospect is merely 
one step in providing the foundation from 
which the broker may develop a sale. 322 P.2d 
at 150. 
The court went on to further indicate that tne key test is that 
the procuring broker is the one who causes a meet1ng of the 
minds between the principals. l£. at 150. See 3lso Hampton 
Park Corp. v. T. D. Burgess Co., Inc., ~· 
The case law on procuring cause clearly requ1res some-
thing more than merely setting a chain of events in mot1on. 
-14-
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It requires that the broker's efforts cause minds to meet, 
for success to be imminent and that the chain of events move 
continually forward as a direct result of the broker's ef-
forts. Such is not the case here. 
Instruction No. 11 given by the court led the jury to 
the conclusion that all Plaintiffs had to do was introduce 
the parties and the commission was earned. That is not the 
law and the jury was improperly instructed. 
The requirement that Plaintiffs be the procuring cause 
of the lease is the only consideration to support the con-
tract alleged by them. Given the substantial nature of the 
commission claimed, in this case ~nd others, to be a procuring 
cause requires effort. The broker must cause a meeting of 
the minds, success must be imminent, he must be dealing with 
authorized people and he must do this all within a reasonable 
period of time. Here, the efforts of Plaintiffs do not amount 
to a peppercorn because there is no causal relationship bet-
ween what they did and the lease which was finally negotiated. 
POINT III 
ROBERT P. MORRIS IS AN IMPROPER PARTY TO 
THIS ACTION. 
On March 17, 1977, Defendant filed a Motion for Summary 
Judgment in t~1s action seeking to have the action dismissed 
~s to Pla1nt1ff Rotert P. Morr1s. (R. p. 29). The grounds 
for sucn mot1on were set forth in the supporting memorandum 
-lS-
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filed therewith. (R. pp. 31, 32). Said motion was denied 
by the lower court. (R. p. 34). Denial of said motion 
was improper and constitutes error in this case. 
Robert P. Morris is a real estate salesman, who was em-
ployed by Plaintiff Gump & Ayers Real Estate, Inc., a real 
estate broker. It has been established by request for 
admission that Robert P. Morris is not now nor has he ever 
been a real estate broker licensed under the laws of Utah. 
(R. p. 23). 
lows: 
Utah Code Annotated§ 61-2-18 (1953) provides as fol-
(a) No person, partnership, association or cor-
poration shall bring or maintain an action in any 
court of this state for the recovery of commis-
sion, a fee or compensation for any act done or 
service rendered, the doing or rendering of which 
is prohibited under the provisions of this act 
to other than licensed real estate brokers, un-
less such person was duly licensed hereunder 
as a real estate broker at the time of the doing 
of such act or the rendering of such service. 
(b) No real estate salesman shall have the right 
to institute suit in his own name for the re-
covery of a fee, commission or compensat1on for 
services as real estate salesman except where 
the action is against the broker but any such 
action shall be instituted and brought by the 
broker with whom the salesman is connected. 
Section 61-2-2, Utah Code Annotated (1953), defines the 
leasing of real property as being an act which must be per-
formed by a licensed real estate broker in order to be legal. 
It has been admitted in this case that Robert P. Morris 1s 
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not a licensed real estate broker. Accordingly, Robert P. 
Morris is not a proper party to the instant lawsuit. The 
statute in question (§61-2-18) speaks in no uncertain terms: 
it provides that a real estate salesman shall not directly 
bring an action for collection of a commission. Defendant 
submits in view of this statute and the admitted facts in 
this lawsuit, the lower court erred in failing to grant the 
Summary Judgment requested. 
Such error is particularly prejudicial to Defendant be-
cause Mr. Morris terminated hi~ employment with Gump & Ayers 
Real Estate, Inc., (the broker), prior to the time the lease 
was consummated with IBM. (R. p. 224). Thus, absent some 
evidence of assignment of the contract rights either to 
another broker or from Morris back to Gump & Ayers Real Es-
tate, Inc., the record does not disclose who owns the claim. 
There is no evidence of an assignment in this case, consequent-
ly it may well be that whoever owns the claim has no right to 
bring suit on it. 
CONCLUSION 
Plaintiffs failed to prove that they were the procur-
ing cause of the lease with IBM. At best, Plaintiffs' evi-
dence required the Jury to engage in rank speculation to 
reach its verdict. Furthermore, the jury was hastened to 
lts insupportaole verd1ct ~y Instr~ction No. 11 which im-
parts the d1stinct 1mpression that a ~ere 1ntroduction of 
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the parties is sufficient consideration to support the 
contract and satisfy the requirement of procuring cause. 
Finally, Robert P. Morris is an improper party to this 
action. 
The Judgment of the lower court should be reversed. 
SNOW, CHRISTENSEN & MARTINEAU 
Inc. 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that I personally delivered two (2) 
copies of the foregoing Brief of Appellant to counsel for 
'K 
Respondents this .:17- day of April, 1978. 
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